I. Introduction
Policymaking bodies normally resist the temptation of using literary figures to coin their policies. Thus, the fact that the Financial Stability Board (FSB) or the European Commission decided to encompass a new set of policies under the name of "shadow banking" 1 should give one pause for thought. Is this a good thing?
To put this in perspective, it is not the first time that moral/literary images are used in the context of financial law. F.D. Roosevelt sold the reform of the Glass-Steagal Act by using the contrast between "productive" and "speculative" banking, 2 not by talking about prudential regulation or systemic stability. The Securities Act of 1933 was promoted as an act to promote "truth" (e.g. not "efficiency" 3 ). Thus, history suggests that there is no harm in spicing up the language a bit.
Furthermore, the language used in shadow banking policy proposals is as grey as possible. The more stable definition of "shadow banking", in FSB papers is "a system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system, and raises i) systemic risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and flawed credit risk transfer, and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns", 4 hardly a literary exercise. Plus the definition accurately identifies the tenets of credit intermediation that pose the greater problems of financial stability, 5 using as a basis "maturity transformation" (the funding of long-term, illiquid, assets with short-term, liquid, liabilities).
The attempt to conceptualize the problem is accompanied by earnest efforts of measurement and data gathering, which are far from metaphorical. FSB has submitted that non-bank financial intermediaries grew from $26 trillion in 2002, to $62 trillion in 2007; and after some decline in 2008, they were already larger in size in 2011 (and keep growing shadow and regular banking; 12 (2) regulation of Money Market Funds, (undertaken by the IOSCO 13 ), to reduce the risk of bank-like "runs"; 14 (3) regulation of "other shadow banking entities" (undertaken by the FSB itself) to define the "functions" of shadow banking's that pose the greater risks, and the policy tools to address them; 15 (4) regulation of securitization 16 , to align the incentives between originators and investors; 17 (5) reform of repos and securities lending markets (also by the FSB 18 ), to limit the build-up of leverage and the system's instability. 19 Thus, if reform efforts rely on a rational assessment, where is the harm in using an evocative and slightly literary concept like "shadow banking"? In principle, none; but the problem of "shadow banking" as a concept is not that it is literary, or that it casts a negative light over the phenomenon, but that it mischaracterizes the problem, by making at least three reductionisms:
-First, the use of a newly minted concept suggests that "shadow banking" is something new, rather than a recurrent episode in financial regulation. This can overlook the lessons of the past, which are critical in devising a solution for the future.
-Second, the focus on "regulatory arbitrage" overlooks the fact that shadow financial intermediation can also result from regulatory subsidies or more complex interactions that resist simplification.
-Third, and most important, by characterizing shadow banking as something that has grown "in the shadow of", or "parallel to" traditional banking the official account overlooks the fact that it is the structure of financial markets, at its core, that has changed.
The problem, in all its complexity, cannot be solved by the simple extension, or fine-tuning, of existing rules, and requires a deeper understanding of the relationship between finance and (legal) institutions. 20 Such need of reassessment is particularly pressing in the European Union at the present time, where recent reforms have heralded a new era for the unification of financial markets. The first limb of these reforms is the Banking Union, which includes a new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) presided over by the European Central Bank (ECB), 21 a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) administered by the Single Resolution Board 22 (where the ECB also has a key role 23 ), and a Single Prudential Rulebook, formed by bank prudential rules, 24 and developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA). 25 The second, still incipient, limb is the Capital Markets Union, whose agenda has been announced by the European Commission in 2015. 26 These reforms signal a moment of triumph for EU public authorities, an actual proof that they can get impressive things done. So who wants to be the killjoy that throws cold water over so much enthusiasm? Yet one needs not diminish these achievements to point out that, despite such major changes in the basement and architecture, it is important not to lose sight of the plumbing, because it was the plumbing what brought us to where we are.
This article argues that the questions raised by shadow banking continue without an answer, and that the danger that such questions are overlooked is greater now that policymakers are busy with grander projects. Yet aside from criticism it also offers a framework of analysis for such questions, one that ensures that emphasizes the fluid connection between finance and the legal institutions underpinning the system. Section II tries to paint a more complete picture of "shadow banking", which is not subject to official simplifications. Section III uses this more complete account for a critical assessment of ongoing reforms, and provide insights that should not be missed. Section IV concludes by arguing strongly for a change of focus.
II. Conceptualizing Shadow Banking
This Section first tries to situate shadow banking in an adequate historical context, one that properly reflects the interaction between banking and law/ State (1). In second place, it uses such 'institutional' approach to construe a more complete narrative of shadow banking as s symptom of profound changes in financial intermediation and money markets (2). The first reductionism of shadow banking is to assume that it is an occurrence of the 2007-2009 crisis, despite the phenomenon, as such, is not new. Banking (understood as maturity transformation and liquidity creation) has always been risky and subject to "runs". The risk has traditionally justified government backstops (deposit insurance or central banks liquidity windows). Government backstops create a moral hazard problem that justifies prudential rules; and those prudential rules create the grounds for funds to flow towards less regulated activities, beginning the cycle again. Furthermore, the emphasis of the FSB and the Commission on the "intermediation" perspective misses an important angle of shadow banking. Shadow banking can also consist in the "monetization" of certain assets, and the ensuing growth of credit and leverage, asset bubbles and financial crises. In some cases the "bankarization" of certain entities was accompanied by the "monetization" of those entities' instruments; 33 but, in other cases, some instruments were 'monetized' without the bankarization of their issuers, as it happened with the chains of accommodation bills in XVIIIth century Holland. 34 This, second, perspective, is well-captured by Charles Kindleberger's "two axioms" for crises: Axiom number one. Inflation depends on the growth of money. Axiom number two. Asset price bubbles depend on the growth of credit.
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The implication for shadow banking is that, when legal institutions are introduced to limit the growth of money, credit and leverage through 'official' channels, the market can 'create money' through unofficial ones.
The fact that shadow banking is not something entirely new does not mean that its latest episode poses no challenges of its own. From an 'intermediation' perspective, unlike previous instances, where less regulated intermediation was concentrated on one or a few types of entities, the 2007-2009 crisis was characterized by the interactions of an unparalleled number of new entities: finance companies, monoline insurers, broker-dealers, money-market funds (MMFs), hedge funds, and an alphabet soup of securitization vehicles ("SPVs", "SIVs", "CDOs", etc) were part of the process.
36 From a 'monetization' perspective, the latest crisis was characterized by the emergence of the repo market, as the key market where financial intermediaries (both banks and non-banks) seek liquidity, and the main source of risk, when such liquidity dries up.
37 Some academic studies have tried to estimate the size of specific repo markets, 38 yet repos are absent from the FSB's Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Reports. 39 Thus, precedents show that, historically, shadow banking is a byproduct of the complex relationship between money, banking, and the law (understood in a broader sense, as finance's institutional structure considered by neoclassical economic theory as "black boxes", or a go-between in the middle of savers and borrowers. 40 Yet historical accounts show that bank "charters" were, in their origins, considered a token of privilege, not an instrument of regulatory control, and that banking structure (and its structural fragility) is a byproduct of its institutions, which are a result of the State's position, and political alliances. 41 The relationship between "money" and institutions is more hotly contested, with two opposite camps. The 'Metallists' argue that money is a product of social interaction (the use of certain commodities, e.g. gold, develops as a means of reducing transaction costs) and the State does not matter (the State normally validates ex post what society's custom); whereas the Chartalists retort that money acquires its value primarily through legal sanction (when the State indicates that its taxes can be paid through a certain means, those means become money).
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Thus, the question is whether the view supported by precedents, which suggests that the State, the law and institutions are often at the core of the problem, is also true with regard to shadow banking's new challenges. The next points discuss this, addressing, first, a micro-prudential perspective that focuses on the "intermediaries", and, then, a macroprudential perspective that focuses on "money".
Applying the institutional approach to shadow banking perspectives
The problem of shadow banking has been put in context, and it is suggested that the adequate approach is one that gives due consideration to the connection between institutions and banking-money to explain the specific narratives and examples of shadow banking. This Section does that, beginning with micro-prudential narratives, based on "intermediaries" (A), and then moving to macro-prudential narratives based on "money" and money markets (B).
A. The institutional approach applied to the 'intermediation' perspective.
An article by Pozsar, Tobias, Ashcraft and Boesky 43 formulated the first approach to model shadow banking dynamics and risk. The idea was that, unlike traditional banking, where maturity, liquidity and credit transformation are concentrated in the balance sheet of a single entity, modern shadow banking had disintegrated the process in pieces, 44 with separate institutions "specializing" in each function. 45 These entities created safe, short-term and liquid assets through the packaging and re-packaging of less safe, long-term, and illiquid cash flows from the primary credit market, in a risk-stripping process. 46 The actual names of the entities involved (which have already changed after the crisis 47 ) is less important than the fact that so many were part of a "process", or "chain" of functions, that resulted in decentralized credit creation. Some entities specialized in originating credit, others in storing and repackaging it, others in trading it, and 43 Zoltan Pozsar; Tobias Adrian; Adam Ashcraft; Hayley Boesky Shadow Banking op. cit. 44 Ibid p. 5. 45 According to their analysis, those functions were: (1) loan origination (typical of finance companies, funded through commercial paper (CP) and notes); (2) loan warehousing (typical of conduits, and funded through asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP); (3) pooling and structuring of loans into term asset-backed securities (ABS) (typically by broker-dealers' ABS syndicate desks, and funded through SPV-issued ABS); (4) ABS warehousing (typically in trading books, and funded through repo, TRS or hybrid conduits); (5) pooling and structuring of ABS Yet their rise to prominence in the United States was, to a certain extent, tolerated, because they were a reaction to Regulation Q, a controversial rule that capped the interest rate offered on deposits, and was eventually derogated. 53 Although MMFs are an instance of regulatory arbitrage, the original problem was in the rules, not the arbitrage.
These instances are not endemic to developed markets. Currently, the Chinese shadow banking system is moderate in size, but has experienced the fastest growth of all countries. One of the more prominent shadow banking entities are Wealth Management Products (WMPs) investment funds that offer better returns than bank deposits. It is not surprising that bank deposits are subject to rigid interest rate caps (not unlike Regulation Q). 54 Nor is it surprising that, despite central government's emphasis on limiting credit growth, this is spurred by local governments, which issue debt through Local Governments Finance Vehicles (LGFVs) another prominent type of Chinese shadow banks. 55 Finally, consider the tool that linked them all: securitization, which has enjoyed the most prominent spot in shadow banking official accounts. It consists in taking assets out of a bank's portfolio, selling them to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) repackaged as notes or securities, not subject to their sponsor's bankruptcy risk.
56 Some banks used it to put assets off-balance sheet, and exclude them from Basel capital requirements, but, when the crisis stroke, they bailedout their vehicles. 57 Others, knowing that they would not bear the risks of securitized assets, lowered lending standards. 58 Yet none of these pathological uses should obscure the fact that securitization, as such, offers an unparalleled means to mobilize credit and increase liquidity, by facilitating asset partitioning and cash flow insulation. This is why securitization was supported by specific statutory rules that facilitated (i.e. not restricted) bankruptcy-remoteness, 59 both in civil law countries, 60 and common law countries. Thus, a closer institutional look reveals that the 'regulatory arbitrage' narrative is too simplistic. The differences in regulatory rules applicable to equivalent activities, and other inconsistencies that are defined as 'shadow banking' often reflect the tensions and discrepancies over the positive and negative effects of a specific type of financial intermediaries.
B. The institutional approach applied to the 'monetization' perspective: from shadows to core
Like the trees that do not let us see the forest a perspective focused on the individual intermediaries may not let us see their interactions and the risks that build up within the system, 62 hence the need to supplement it with a 'macro' perspective that looks at the dynamics of money markets. Studies have shown that these were characterized by the use of repos to generate money-like claims.
63 Both banks and shadow banks regularly resort to repo markets for these purposes.
The pathologies that led to an uncontrolled growth of credit were a result of the increase of the type of collateral that could be used for these purposes (which was expanded from government bonds to securitized assets) and of the re-use of collateral (so-called re-hypothecation) which gave rise to "collateral chains". 64 The "velocity" of collateral circulation 65 increased the amount of money-like claims and leverage. It also exposed the main players, dealer banks, who re-used their clients' assets to the claims of those clients, and exposed depository banks to contagion. Mehrling et al used this development to define shadow banking as "money market funding of capital market lending", 67 and emphasize the growth of "private money" alongside "public money" as its defining trait. This factor made the market reliant on an unstable supply of credit (based on volatile expectations on the returns of long-term assets).
68 Pozsar deepens into this narrative, to describe how money markets have changed. Far from the neat division between what is money, and what is not, one can see a range of assets with varying degrees of "moneyness", which include 'public' assets, 'private' assets, and 'public-private' (or private-public') assets. 69 These narratives suggest that both the assets' 'moneyness', and the current structure of money markets is a hybrid product of the interaction between market forces and the law, 70 which has led to a more de-centralized, uncontrolled, and volatile process of credit creation. Bills; (2) a second level would include private instruments with explicit public (credit and liquidity) backstops, such as retail deposits. More importantly, the next levels would include the "shadow monetary base", which would begin where conventional money measures (M0-M2) end: they would comprise a (3) third level, the so-called "publicprivate" money, or "public shadow money", without explicit public backing, but with an implicit one, arising from the type of assets that back the claim (such as Treasuries, in Treasury repos of Dealer Banks' Government desks; or CNAV shares of Governmentonly MMFs), and (4) a fourth level, with the "purely private" money, or "private shadow money", formed by repos backed by non-government assets in Dealer Banks' Credit Desks, and CNAV shares of "prime" MMFs, and, in last place, uninsured deposits (exceeding the limits of deposit insurance). Zoltan Pozsar "Shadow Banking: The Money View" OFR Working Paper (July 2014). The paper is accompanied by an Appendix with a graphical explanation, "How the Financial System Works. A Map of Money Flows in the Global Financial Ecosystem" July 2014. The access to assets and sources also establishes a certain hierarchy among the system's participants, in the sense that central bank reserves is money for banks, T-repos with banks is money for dealers, and T-repos with dealers is money for MMFs. 70 This is the main proposition of Katharina Pistor's Legal Theory of Finance (LTF It is not difficult to see the connection between this process, and the market's institutional structure. Traditionally, the system of fractional reserve banking was conceived to grant some degree of control over the quantity of money that could be created, which gave rise to the academic concept of the 'money multiplier'. 71 Modern central banking shows that such constructs are a 'myth': central banks no longer target money aggregates, but long-term interest rates, and they do so through the announcement of policy rates. They primarily use open market operations (OMOs) to manage liquidity and avoid extreme rate spikes, but not as a customary way of setting interest rates indirectly by adjusting the quantity of money. 72 The consequence is that, contrary to the academic description of banks as a 'go-between' that intermediates between savers and borrowers, and uses the formers' money to lend to the latter, banks 'create money'. In fact, they are the driving force behind money creation. Moreover, they do so by first identifying investment opportunities, and, then, funding them with money-like liabilities. The volume of loans determines the volume of deposits, not the opposite, 73 and central banks have no control over this process. Capital requirements, not reserve requirements, are the only means left to limit credit growth. 74 If public authorities have lost control over money/credit creation at the core of the system, it should not be surprising that, when it comes to unconventional money-creation channels, such as repos, policymakers are not even fully aware of the market's size, structure, and dynamics. But this, too, is partly explained by the institutions underpinning modern money markets, and the conscious or unconscious policy choices they reflect.
To begin with, shadow banking as a 'market' phenomenon is inextricably linked to the balance sheet expansion and contraction of dealer (i.e. not commercial) banks. 75 The rise to prominence of dealer banks is not a product of chance. For years central banks' have been executing their operations (repos, purchases or sales of government bills, bonds or securities) through the same dealer banks, which, in most cases, are a select and narrow group of financial institutions. 76 The rules that regulate the dealer banks' relationship with central banks emphasize the dealer banks' duties (e.g. duty to participate in auctions, and duty to behave as a 'responsible counterparty' 77 ) but it is actually a relationship of privilege, 78 with first-hand access to the central bank. The duty to furnish relevant market information to help the central bank implement policy provides an invaluable opportunity to share their concerns and viewpoints, and establish a relationship of trust. 79 Since auctioning of government debt also tends to be subject to a dealer system, 80 major dealer banks enjoy a preponderant presence in the two markets that determine the primary supply of money assets.
Normally such privileges should come in a 'package' with enhanced duties, including prudential rules. 81 Furthermore in the market-based credit system (with dealers at its core) liquidity and certainty over prices matter the most, 82 which also means that market liquidity is more subject to drastic swings, hence the need of proper regulation. However, for a long time many dealer banks were not subject to the Basel prudential framework, and there are precedents showing that attempts to craft specific prudential rules for them did not generally prove effective. In summary, the loss of control over credit creation is not a result of unconventional activities developing at the margins, but a direct consequence of the institutional structure at the system's core. 84 The increased demand for liquidity was satisfied by using government bonds as 'money-like' assets, 85 then, by expanding the range of these assets further, to include securitized assets, then, by re-hypothecating all available assets, 86 and all this could be accomplished thanks to dealers' ability to straddle money and capital markets.
Furthermore, repo, the transaction that made all this possible, is also partly a result of policy choices. In the United States, for example, when courts challenged the status of repo contracts, and subjected them to an automatic stay in bankruptcy, 87 the reaction was to enact a specific safe-harbor to protect the collateral-taker rights in bankruptcy.
88 EU rules provide a similar 'regulatory privilege', or subsidy, without having introduced any regulatory requirements (which could grant some degree of control) as a precondition to enjoy that privilege. 89 The United States repo market is dominated by bilateral repos and 90 whereas in Europe market counterparties tend to use anonymous trading through CCPs, but the bilateral market remains important; all this despite bilateral repo markets tend to be more unstable. 91 Until the crisis not much thought was given to the optimal structure for the market, and it is surprising how little consideration it has received since. 92 Therefore, shadow banking's 'monetization' angle, the market structure that emerges from it, and the macroprudential risks associated to that structure, cannot be explained by an unidimensional tale of market players' who attempt to circumvent the rules. The story has a more complex and interwoven narrative, where policymakers made certain choices, and put some tools at market players' disposal without properly thinking through the consequences of market players' use of these tools. The answer to the question of 'what is money', thus, transcends Metallist and Chartalist versions:
93 modern money and money markets are the combined result of a process of decentralization of money creation led by market players who nonetheless still use government-backed assets (central bank reserves and government bonds) and legal institutions as the building blocks of that process. The result is a cause of concern, but public authorities are partly to blame by providing the tools without an instructions manual, or at least some guidelines and controls.
III. Shadow Banking: A Critical Appraisal of Reforms
The previous Section showed how official accounts of shadow banking fail to capture the complex relationship that exists between market forces and their institutional environment, both with respect to shadow banking entities (GSEs, MMFs, dealer banks) or transactions (securitization or repos). This Section tries to evaluate how these biases can affect proposals of reform, on shadow banking intermediation (1) and money markets (2); as well as more general reforms on Banking and Capital Markets Union (3). 
ECFR 1/2016
The Blind Spot in Banking and Capital Markets Reform1. Intermediation reforms. Shadow banking, legal interpretation and consistency
There are two ways of approaching shadow banking as an 'intermediation' problem: we can consider it a 'borderline' problem (where there is disagreement as to how to apply the rules to a case, but agreement as to the rules' underpinning principles), or a pivotal problem (where the disagreement about the application to a case masks a deeper disagreement about the principles).
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If we consider it a borderline problem, the question would be 'how can we apply bank-like prudential rules to non-banks?' This is what the FSB has proposed in its document on 'shadow banking entities'. The FSB classifies shadow banks by their 'functions', which are a measure of their risk, 95 and proposes a policy toolkit for each function. This toolkit consists in applying to non-banks the prudential rules of banks with varying degrees of intensity, including the 'core' prudential rules (on leverage, capital or liquidity requirements 96 ) and other more specific rules depending on the entities' specific risks. 97 The FSB supple- An alert reader will have no difficulty in identifying the functions undertaken by (1) MMFs, (2) finance companies, (3) broker-dealers and some hedge funds, (4) insurance companies and some hedge funds, (5) complex securitization vehicles. 96 For three of the banking "functions" ("provision of loans that is dependent on short-term funding", "Intermediation of market activities that is dependent on short-term funding or on secured funding of client assets", "facilitation of credit creation") the FSB proposes similar solutions, consisting in the adoption of bank-like prudential requirements, such as capital and liquidity requirements, which are also present in the proposals for fund management susceptible to runs, and securitization-based credit intermediation. but the rationale behind its regulation, and the way this rationale is actually reflected in the rules. According to these rules, a 'credit institution' is:
"an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account;" 100 Thus, the rules define the institution by its function (i.e. not its legal form, or the 'charter' it chooses). This can be surprising to someone who is used to the idea that the recipe for shadow banking is more 'functional' regulation.
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How can one square this with the fact that the regulation was already functional before the crisis? 102 As it stands, the definition above could encompass most new types of financial intermediation. It all depends on how far one is 
ECFR 1/2016
The Blind Spot in Banking and Capital Markets Reformprepared to stretch concepts such as "receiving deposits or other repayable funds", "from the public", or "granting credits". Furthermore, in Romanelli the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) showed that it was prepared to stretch these concepts quite far. In that case, the Romanelli brothers were prosecuted for selling to third parties instruments representing an amount receivable and immediate repurchased at a price which incorporated the agreed interest, and warrants representing an option to acquire debentures issued by Romanelli Finanzaria SpA. 103 The Court had to decide whether this amounted to 'banking'. It held that it did, and thus a license was needed, because the definition had to be interpreted "broadly".
104 Thus, if the approach of the rules is functional, and the courts are prepared to interpret it with flexibility, where is the problem?
The problem, as usual, is in the details. It is one thing for the rules to be interpreted functionally and broadly in a case where the alternative is that the activities go unregulated. It is another to ask that the same functional and broad interpretation should be done in cases where the activity is already regulated by a different set of rules. This is easy to see if we switch from the rules for credit institutions tothe rules for otherintermediaries. An "investment firm" is defined as "any legal person whose regular occupation is the provision of one or more investment services [. . .] on a professional basis", including reception, transmission and execution of orders, dealing on own account, portfolio management or investment advice 105 (a broad and functional definition). An undertaking for the collective investment in securities (UCITS) is an undertaking that invests in transferable securities or other financial assets, raises capital from the public, and functions on the principle of risk-spreading, with units that are redeemable 103 Case C-366/97 Criminal proceedings against Massimo Romanelli and Paolo Romanelli ECR [1999] I-00855 at 5. According to Italian banking regulations that had transposed the Directive, the term "repayable funds" could be interpreted either as referring only to financial instruments which, by their intrinsic nature, embody an obligation of repayment, or as covering also those financial instruments in which the requirement of restitution derived from specific contractual provisions. Romanelli para. 7. The Romanelli brothers defense was that the funds raised from the public through certain financial instruments were not "intrinsically repayable", but repayable only as a result of a separate "restitution agreement". The result ultimately depended on the interpretation given to the Directive's provision. 104 The Court stated, referring to the Opinion of AG Fennelly, 29 October 1998, that "a narrower interpretation, as contended for by the defendants in the main proceedings, would undermine the objective of protecting consumers against the harm which they could suffer through financial transactions." Ibid at 16. 105 Article 4 (1) of the MiFiD II (Directive 2014/65/EU) defines "investment firm" as an undertaking providing investment services and activities over financial instruments, and refers to Annex I for a specification of what are "investment services" (Section A) and what are "financial instruments" (Section C).
by investors 106 (same approach). And an "alternative investment fund (AIFs)" (which includes hedge funds) is a UCITS with an investment policy, but one that does notneed authorization as aUCITS (normally because the number ofinvestors is below the legal requirement 107 ). Insurance undertakings are also characterized in seemingly broad terms. 108 Thus, considered in isolation, all the rules adopt a functional and broad approach, which ensures that financial activities do not go unregulated; but the combination of these same rules can create a conceptual overlap for entities engaging in new activities, 109 an overlap that can be exploited by their sponsors to avoid the more burdensome (usually banking) rules, using other rules as a safe harbor. The shadow banking problem does not arise in a scenario of unregulated activities, but differently regulated ones. In this scenario, proposing a 'functional' approach for banking prudential rules is tantamount to advocating that these rules should be treated as a kind of 'trumping card', with preference over the rest, or as an interpretative device to construe other rules in light of their meaning and purpose. This 'trumping' or interpretative approach would require to consider the universe of the rules for the different types of financial institutions as a whole body, inspired by the same principles, and extract from that body that prudential principles, as reflected in bank rules, are the prevailing principles, a sort of 'core', or 'model' legal propositions, which irradiate or inspire other rules.
110 This is a complex task, 111 and it is made more difficult by the fact that prudential goals, albeit present from long ago in the economic discourse, are relatively recent tools of legal interpretation. Consider again the Romanelli case, where the CJEU held that a 'broad' interpretation of banking activities was appropriate. The Court justified this view on consumer protection, which, in the Court's own assessment, was the principle underpinning the rules. This view is still very present in the scope of rules applicable to financial intermediaries when they require that these intermediaries take, or manage, funds "from the public". 113 Yet consumer protection as a principle does not justify extending banking rules to cases that could be covered by other rules, nor interpreting the rules for other intermediaries in light of banking rules. Even an understanding that sees microprudential rules as a means to anticipate consumer protection, does not per se justify a teleological extension of banking rules, or their meaning.
It is possible to realize now the nature of shadow banking's problem. The problem is with the definition of 'bank', because this definition, and the scope of application of the rules, can differ depending on whether the aim of the rules is to protect 'consumers', or also to protect the 'system'. Arguably, the substance, and emphasis of bank rules has lately pivoted towards the system, 114 but this is the result of recent reforms, and has yet to translate into a switch of the interpretative approach for all the rules. This task is made more difficult by three factors. One is the difficulty to read such clear prudential 'meaning', or priority, in some sets of rules. The AIF Directive, for example, was passed amidst fears about the risk hedge funds could pose to the market, 115 but the rules themselves are at least as focused on transparency and client protection, or the fate of the companies where funds take a controlling stake, as they are on leverage, liquidity, or risk management. 116 Furthermore, rules that reflect prudential concerns are often not policed by supervisors specialized in prudential rules (e.g. central banks), but by supervisors specialized in market conduct rules (e.g. securities commissions 117 ).
the requirements relating to their solvency or whose managers do not have the necessary professional qualifications or integrity". Ibid at 11, with reference to Case C-222/95 A second factor is that, generally, the scope of application of the rules (even prudential rules) relies more on the external perception of the service (which may be a relevant factor from a consumer protection perspective), than its intrinsic risk (which would be the relevant factor from a prudential perspective). One only needs to look at the definitions four paragraphs above to realize that. This is consistent with a construction of the rules that has consumer protection at its core, rather than more 'prudential' principles, such as the need to restrict leverage, or to preserve liquidity, but it does not look well for our purposes to seek the consistency of prudential rules.
In fact, historical precedents show that the norm has been that even rules inspired by prudential concerns follow consumer-based distinctions in their scope of application. In the post-Glass-Steagall era, the United States Supreme Court had to decide, in several landmark cases, whether certain acts breached the prohibition of the Act. The debate always revolved around whether the 'services' offered were 'banking' or 'investment', not whether the entity had one, or another, risk profile. 118 The same can be said about the banking-insurance distinction. 119 In fact, the emphasis on 'functional' regulation is often based on consumer protection considerations, not prudential ones. 120 In the EU, a proposal of a regulation on Money Market Funds (MMFs) was inspired A third factor is the difficulty of public authorities to resist the temptation to carve-out exceptions to the general rules for specific types of institutions that perform a socially desirable role. The above difficulties in finding common prudential principles in harmonized EU rules together pales in comparison with the task of making sense of domestic rules, which may reflect specific political compromises. 123 GSEs, saving banks, finance companies are but the tip of the iceberg of shadow banking's idiosyncratic nature. The FSB seems to be aware of this, and in its shadow banking monitoring reports, together with aggregate data, it now offers individual case studies, 124 but that has not made it change its overall approach.
Thus, shadow banking is, at its core, a problem of legal consistency. Legal consistency is eroded when market players seek to avoid the spirit of the rules; but, even more, when lawmakers grant carve-outs to those rules, or different rules. Consistency is also eroded when rules that reflect the same principles are scattered across different legal texts. This is especially acute when the legal norms have a scope of application inspired by principles that differ from the principles behind the substantive rules in the body of the norm, or when that body mixes prudential and consumer protection rules. Given the nature of the problem, enacting new rules for each new type of institution or activity, as it seems to be suggested by the FSB, 125 or the European Commission, 126 will only exacerbate the problem of inconsistency and will make a principles-based interpretation more difficult.
The only sensible solution in light of the above diagnosis would be to enhance consistency, by merging the rules inspired by common prudential principles, and re-defining their scope of application in terms of the risks of the activity (or the asset/liability structure as a proxy for that risk 127 ) not the external perception of that activity. This would result in a Prudential Directive/Regulation, applicable to all 'financial intermediaries'. In fact, this view finds support in the 'twin peaks' structure, which proposes to concentrate prudential supervision into one entity; 128 or in the attempt by the EU legislature to create a 'Single Prudential Rulebook' applicable to banks and investment firms. 129 The 125 The FSB is not explicitly suggesting new statutes, but, in the 'fourth overarching principle' of its peer review process, it states: "that authorities should assess their non-bank financial entities based on the economic functions and take necessary actions drawing on tools from their policy toolkit if necessary to mitigate the financial stability risks identified." FSB Thematic peer review on the implementation of the FSB policy framework for other shadow banking entities Summarized Terms of Reference 22 July 2015, p. 4. Thus, authorities will be rewarded for undertaking new actions, especially if they draw from the policy toolkit drawn by the FSB. problem of these initiatives is not their intuition, which is right, but their reach, which is not ambitious enough. An institutional perspective, based on precedents, and legal construction, shows that arbitrage festers among complex, scattered, and disparate rules. The only possible conclusion is that a unification of prudential rules for all financial intermediaries would go a long way towards solving the problem.
Some reasonable criticism can be anticipated. One could say that most financial intermediaries would be out of business if they were subject to Basel-like prudential rules. The answer is that exceptions could be made, for example requiring simplified, or less exacting, prudential requirements for entities below a certain size, entities with a better matching of maturities between assets and liabilities, or entities that perform certain socially desirable functions. However, these exceptions should be included into the prudential requirements, not granted via separate statutory rules. This would achieve three extra goals. One, an exception that is codified as a statutory exemption is an express acknowledgement that, despite a certain entity engages in 'credit intermediation' or 'maturity transformation', lawmakers choose to grant it different conditions. This is a more open and transparent way of doing policy than granting better deals behind closed doors, and then pretending that the entity is 'distinct', or that the entity does not do 'banking' or 'financial intermediation'. Two, in the process of devising exceptions or special rules for other intermediaries, policymakers may inevitably realize that bank rules are, themselves, unnecessarily complicated, and choose to make them more manageable. 130 Three, by acknowledging that financial intermediaries may do different things, yet pose risks of similar nature, the consistency of the whole edifice of rules will be strengthened, not weakened, and the questions 'what is a bank' and 'why is it regulated' will find a more complete, and holistic, answer. This is not to say that implementing such reforms would be easy. In fact, given their difficulty, and the current legal/political landscape, the look unlikely. Yet a proper approach to the problem of shadow banking intermediation should begin by admitting where the problem lies, and adequately acknowledging its legal dimension. Principles of legal construction should play a defining role of policy if reforms are to achieve anything. Otherwise, new rules will only lead to more fragmentation, arbitrage, and subsidies.
Money market reforms. Institutional, monetary and constitutional implications
It is noticeable how, once one moves to the perspective of 'monetization' and money markets, policymakers become much more cautious. Unlike the 'intermediation' field, where the problem is deciding how far to go, in the monetization field the debate is about what the problem is. Still, even by those standards, the proposed shadow banking reforms are surprisingly timid.
To be fair, the reform proposed by the European Commission on Securities Financing Transactions (SFTs) has correctly identified the need to address the data gap as a priority, and thus focuses on reporting duties (to facilitate information gathering by the supervisor) and disclosure duties (to enhance investor protection). 131 This is in line with the FSB framework on repos and securities lending, which primarily focuses on transparency and data-gathering.
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The FSB goes a bit further, and proposes standards for collateral valuation and management, 133 and cash collateral reinvestment, to address liquidity risks, 134 131 The European Commission proposal is divided into "Transparency of SFTs including registration and supervision of trade repositories" (Chapters II and III), and "Transparency towards investor" (Chapter IV). 132 Of the FSB's 11 recommendations, the first 3 focus on the need to gather better, more granular, and more specific data on these markets, and at least 2 others focus on the need to increase transparency of financial intermediaries towards the public and their clients. Recommendation 1 focuses on the need that authorities collect more granular data on securities lending and repo exposures amongst large international financial institutions; recommendation 2 emphasizes the need that data collection includes trade-level (flow) data and regular snapshots of outstanding balances (position/stock data) for repo markets, and at least regular snapshots of outstanding balances for securities lending; and recommendation 3 indicates that the FSB should aggregate the national/regional data. Recommendations 4 and 5 state the need to improve public disclosure for financial institutions' securities lending, repo and wider collateral management activities, and consider existing gaps in existing reporting requirements. Recommendation 7 also states that new rules regulating re-hypothecation ensure that intermediaries' clients are sufficiently informed. See The Blind Spot in Banking and Capital Markets Reformas well as mandatory rules for the calculation of haircuts for non-centrally cleared repos, which try to limit procyclicality. 135 However, these measures fail to address the institutional aspects that were (and are) at the root of money markets' shadow banking problem. For example, regarding asset re-hypothecation, the FSB's approach relies on disclosure and client consent, rather than regulatory limits, 136 which, again, shows the tension between (macro) prudential and consumer/investor protection principles as the rationale behind the rules. Regarding a possible derogation or restriction of repo's bankruptcy protection (regulatory subsidy), the FSB recommends inaction. 137 The FSB also recommends inaction with regard to the possibility of mandating, or encouraging, centralization of trades onto CCPs, despite centralization has been the approach for OTC derivatives, 138 and evidence suggests that the CCP-centralized repo market is more stable.
139 Furthermore, neither the FSB nor the Commission mention how the processes and dynamics of money and credit growth can be stabilized in the absence of restrictions, or centralized controls.
Thus, the more intrusive measures, which consist in 'codifying' a list of liquid assets, or limiting cash collateral reinvestment, will be insufficient. It is unrealistic to assume that the range of money assets can be determined by regulatory diktat, without further measures that influence the market's institutional structure.
The nature of these 'further measures' will depend on the view one adopts about the causes of current money-creation processes. One could adopt a capital preservation, and that the management of cash collateral does not add extra risk, by looking in particular at the risk of maturity mismatch. To address these goals the specific rules would require that certain percentages are invested in deposits or government debt, or would impose caps on the average maturity of the portfolio, and maximum maturity of the instruments. 135 FSB Regulatory framework for haircuts on non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions October 2014. 136 This includes a broad recommendation that an expert group examines harmonization of client asset protection rules, and more concrete proposals of de minimis limits to rehypothecation, such as its restriction to entities subject to liquidity risk rules, or the prohibition that re-hypothecation is used to finance the own accounts activities of the intermediary (recommendations 7 and 8 'restrictive' view, which surmises that current money creation results from speculative flows; or a more 'skeptical' view, which considers that it may result from speculation, but it may as well not. This is important, as either view calls for a different approach.
A restrictive view would require the list of 'liquid' money assets to be accompanied by rules that constrain speculative flows. Some authors suggest that this could be accomplished by capital controls, taxation of flows, or subsidiarisation and ring fencing. 140 Even though some current structural reforms emphasize ring-fencing, 141 the shadow banking angle is not very present.
Following the same 'restrictive' philosophy, another possibility would be to implement the 100% reserve requirement for banks, meaning that monetary and credit functions would have to be separated. 142 Yet, rather than bringing shadow banking back into the regulatory perimeter, this would push all lending towards shadow banking entities; an aspect (among many) which advocates of the 100% reserve system tiptoe over. 143 However, albeit unrealistic, taken by 'investment trusts', which could be funded by savers' equity, and invest in corporate equity, or lend money to net borrowers once savers had deposited government-issued money with them, in exchange for debt instruments. Jaromir Benes; Michael Kumhof "The Chicago Plan Revisited" op. cit. p. p. 5. In the second alternative, it is difficult to see how any rules could prevent these debt instruments from being treated like money-like (a problem the authors acknowledge, but do not resolve). In the first alternative, it is difficult to see how entrepreneurs and households could then have access to credit, not to mention the fact that it would be impossible to 'eliminate corporate debt' as the authors propose, unless the loan contract were declared illegal.
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Under an 'open' or 'skeptical' view, the priority would be to have not a set of restrictive rules, but of flexible tools that public authorities can use to adjust supply and demand in money markets. Thus, instead of the above rules-based approach, this would mean adopting a discretion-based one. Rather than on regulatory restrictions, this would rely on public authorities' discretionary powers to stabilize supply and demand of money assets.
This role would typically fall with central banks, who would become 'dealers of last resort'. 144 During 'lean' times, when deposits and other money-like assets are being destroyed, central banks could expand the money supply, by expanding the range of assets that they could accept for their operations (thereby enhancing their liquidity and 'moneyness'), as the ECB did during the crisis, 145 and as authors like Minsky suggested should be done. 146 They could also expand the counterparties they could deal with, 147 thereby enhancing the perceived liquidity of the instruments issued or traded by them. Either way, this would pose three major challenges.
The first challenge would be to understand the mutual influences between monetary policy and prudential requirements. 148 Regulatory restrictions on capital and liquidity should be consistent with monetary tools (e.g. regulatory lists of 'liquid' assets should be aligned with the list of assets accepted as collateral by central banks, liquidity ratios should not push banks towards
In any event, it is unclear how the rules could prevent money and lending activities from being combined (even if the 'conglomeration' of such activities were prohibited, firms could sign strategic agreements or have implicit understandings so that credit extended would be implicitly backed by government-issued money-like assets. If history offers any lessons it is about how easily ideal economic plans overlook the legal side. ).
The second challenge would be in expanding the task of central banks, to make them intervene not only during crisis times, but also during good times, by 'leaning against the wind', when there is an excess in the growth of credit.
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This requires models that take into account the non-linearities caused by financial frictions better than the currently used Dynamic General Stochastic Equilibrium models. 151 Before better models are fully functional, central banks will be extremely reluctant to intervene during boom years. This may not only affect the administration of monetary interventions, but also the application of countercyclical requirements. Given public authorities' willingness to intervene in lean times, this creates an asymmetry that can give rise to an important problem of moral hazard.
The third challenge is to restore some degree of control over money-creation processes to the authorities entrusted with monetary and financial stability. Thus, current reforms and proposals offer some interesting openings, but clearly miss the mark over the dimension of the problem. There is no attempt to change the structure of the market, nor any mention as to how regulatory policy should be combined with central bank interventions. As far as beginnings go, this one is even less promising than the one for shadow banking intermediaries.
3. Shadow banking's preliminary implications for the Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, and EU institutional architecture
At this point, a reasonable question is what does shadow banking have to do with the new architecture of the Banking Union, and the soon-to-come reforms of the Capital Markets Union. The answer is that shadow banking problems are not acknowledged by any of the two reforms, and yet they could prove the undoing of the new architecture.
This article has made clear that money/credit and capital markets are not separate entities. Major players in money markets are also major players in capital markets (actually, they benefit from being present in both), and the process of creating money-like liabilities is heavily reliant on capital market institutions. Yet the two major reforms resulting from the crisis continue to uphold the idea that there is such neat distinction, and that it can be used as a policymaking compass.
This is not to say that the Banking Union is not impressive, or that the Capital Markets Union is not promising, but that proponents of one and the other seem to be making policy as if they were closed compartments. The Banking Union is construed under a premise of intermediation and centralization: banking risks are in banks, and supervision and backstops should be centralized. 154 The Capital Markets Union, on the other hand, follows a disintermediation, and de-centralization agenda, which tries to facilitate direct (and disintermediated) access by firms to capital 'markets' and investors. 155 The Banking Union follows a regulatory agenda focused on soundness and stabil-154 In addition to supervision being centralized in the ECB by the SSM Regulation, and resolution in the Single Resolution Board, article 1 SRM Regulation relies Article 1 SRM Regulation provides that "The SRM shall be supported by a single resolution fund ('the Fund')", which is contingent upon an intergovernmental agreement, for the transfer of domestic funds to the SRF, and the gradual merger of those funds (and their allocation to national compartments of the SRF 157 The contrast is not significant only for the features that are highlighted, but for those that are sidestepped. Banking Union rules ignore 'markets'. Even the ECB's macroprudential tools focus on individual banks. 158 They are also based on Basel Framework rules, 159 whose core, even after reforms that enhance their macroprudential focus, is of microprudential inspiration, based on the safety of individual banks, not the 'market'. Conversely, the agenda of the Capital Markets Union completely sidesteps intermediaries, 160 and seems to work under the assumption that markets can work on their own. 161 Infrastructures that are critical to the functioning of credit markets (CCPs or CSDs) are only treated under capital markets proposals, which emphasize fund mobilization 162 ). This 'fully intermediated' view of banking, and 'disintermediated' view of capital markets is not accurate. The previous Sections have shown that straddling the boundaries of capital and money markets is not a feat of quirky entities, but the bread-and-butter of the most important players (especially in Europe, which is characterized by universal banks).
Tackling shadow banking challenges in this context is made (even) more difficult by other factors endemic to the EU's institutional architecture. One is article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which clearly affects shadow banking's angle of the intermediaries, as it states that the Council may "confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance financial stability goals need to be justifiable also in terms of ensuring price stability, and cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal.
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Though in practice the Court has been ready to grant ample discretion 171 to the ECB at a time of deflationary pressures, it is unclear whether the Court would be equally forgiving if the ECB were to intervene during boom years, by 'leaning against the wind', and constraining growth. Stabilizing money markets, including shadow banking, requires both types of interventions; otherwise ECB shadow banking policy will be limp, and shadow money markets will run amok again.
A third factor is the distribution of supervisory competences. Regulatory arbitrageurs thrive in the face of conflict and supervisory turf wars. 172 In the EU typical tensions between 'field' supervisors (e.g. banking and securities) can be exacerbated by the division of tasks between EU and domestic supervisors, since the ECB is competent over 'significant credit institutions', and domestic supervisors over the other institutions 173 plus markets (with ESMA in a coordinating role over markets, funds, or investment firms). This may reduce the risk of regulatory capture for large institutions, but may exacerbate it for smaller ones, or markets. Deprived of their more important supervisory responsibilities, domestic authorities (and lawmakers) may feel less inclined to use EU prudential policies as a blueprint for their domestic financial institutions, or to resist the temptation towards leniency, especially when that may facilitate access to credit for socially desirable goals. Given that small-scale, 'proximity' banking seems to be outside the focus of the Banking Union, its role should be part of the agenda of the Capital Markets Union if funds are to be mobilized, and no new risks are to emerge. 
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IV. Conclusions
Solving shadow banking issues is a complex task, but one that, in essence, requires answering two simple questions, and following one simple command. The two questions are 'how much financial intermediation should be undertaken by entities that issue money-like liabilities?', and 'what degree of central control should public authorities retain over the creation of those liabilities, and in what form?' The command is 'turn the answer to these questions into clear policy choices, which can be translated into explicit legal provisions (please)'. Shadow banking can arise whenever market players wish to circumvent those policy choices. More often, however, it results when the above questions find no answer, or the answer is not translated into explicit choices or consistent legal provisions.
To be fair, legislatures and policymakers are not in an enviable position. The complexity of today's financial markets, and the globalization of capital flows, makes it impossible to assure full control over credit growth, and the ways it is funded by money-like liabilities. Anyone willing to make such pledge would simply lose credibility. However, it is one thing to acknowledge that, and quite another to say that public authorities are free of blame, or that nothing can be done.
Current money markets are a result of an experiment. This experiment was not decided at once, or in a single place, but it was an experiment nonetheless. One where public authorities gradually surrendered control over money creation.
In a context where money is made of promises, all that needed to be done was to provide a system of public backstops (deposit insurance and central bank liquidity) over a 'core' category of liabilities (deposits), and the support of legal institutions for private players to create a 'periphery' of such liabilities (securitization and repos). This meant that central banks could lose track of the size and shape of the markets that emerged, and the institutional structures underpinning them. They could even stop controlling the quantity of core liabilities: interest rates could take care of inflation; capital requirements could take care of leverage (and asset bubbles), at least, this was the bet.
That bet (do we need to say it?) proved wrong. In what concerns intermediaries, capital and other prudential requirements can only restrain leverage if they are imposed upon all entities capable of creating money-like liabilities and intermediating credit. Policymakers underestimated market players' ingenuity, but they underestimated even more domestic legislatures' appetite for playing 'designer-in-chief', and their willingness to facilitate access to credit at the expense of soundness and stability. In what concerns money markets, it is difficult to send a clear signal that credit-creation using money markets should be constrained if policymakers refuse themselves the tools to restrain it (e.g. by sticking to narrow monetary mandates) and show unflagging support for the legal institutions that help to de-centralize the process (repos' bankruptcy protection, securitization's bankruptcy-remoteness), without any attempts to claw-back control.
Any meaningful reform of banking/credit and capital markets needs to address the processes that straddle the two markets. This is what shadow banking is about. For starters, any reformulation of prudential requirements should begin not by complicating their substance, but by clarifying their scope of application, which should encompass all entities that engage in maturity transformation, and, more generally, credit intermediation. To this end the scope of application of the rules should depend on factors such as the activity's intrinsic risk, or the entities' asset/liability structure, instead of the nature of the services rendered to the public. Furthermore (most likely) require divorcing prudential rules from consumer/investor protection and market conduct rules. This would not only improve operational efficiency, but legal consistency.
Some entities could still benefit from a less exacting regime (e.g. simplified capital/leverage requirements), but this would be based on explicit policy choices that weigh financial stability versus other social goals, and are translated into express legislative exemptions lawmakers can be accountable for. Beneficial treatment should be granted on the basis of lesser risk, or greater social benefit, not under the false pretense that the beneficiaries' activity is not credit intermediation, and thus should fall outside the scope of prudential rules. To do so only fragments the rules, and hinders their consistency as a whole body inspired by common principles.
The reform should also acknowledge the interplay between regulatory policy and central bank intervention in money markets, and the critical role that certain infrastructures have for these markets. The past crisis could have been worse had it not been for central banks' arsenal, but this will create a moral hazard problem in the future unless some degree of central control is restored over the markets where money-like claims are created and traded. Central banks can prescribe operational rules for collateral, but these need to be aligned with prudential rules on liquidity and haircuts, and accompanied by some degree of centralization of trades, clearing and settlement, all subject to prudential supervision. It is not a system as centralized as theoretical models of fractional reserve banking, but it is better than ignoring money-market dynamics beyond the narrow circle of central bank operations, as was the case before the crisis.
These reforms should be a centerpiece of current efforts to achieve a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union. Yet the dividing lines chosen by EU policymakers show that we may be back to the old mistakes of the past: assuming that credit/money is intermediated without markets, and that capital markets func-tion without intermediaries. It is inaccurate and dangerous. EU law poses challenges to the centralization and harmonization of prudential rules and tasks, to the consistency of prudential and monetary tasks, and to the coordination of domestic and EU supervisory levels. Yet most challenges are not insurmountable. They just require acknowledging the problem for what it is.
In conclusion, concepts, including metaphoric ones, are important for the legal process, as they help to simplify and visualize complex problems. The trouble arises when concepts misrepresent or oversimplify the problem at hand. Sadly, this is what 'shadow banking' does. Not because it paints certain types of credit intermediation as shady, but because it treats the problem as marginal.
Rather than 'in the shadow of' the financial system, it is front and center.
This article tries to paint a more realistic picture by acknowledging shadow banking precedents, and the tense relationship they reveal between money, finance and law. It is rare for shadow banking to be just a symptom of maverick financial intermediaries, without the backing of specific legal institutions and regulatory subsidies. The change is that now the 'parallel' system has become the core, but that only makes an honest assessment of the problem more necessary.
Reforms that do that will be no definitive antidote for future crises. Risk always finds a way. Yet they would create a more robust financial law for the future, rather than putting a bandage over the mistakes of the past. A less exciting task than bringing light to a world of darkness, perhaps, but one that would see shadow banking for the central problem that it is. Put another way, Aesop tells us a fable of a dog who carried a piece of meat; and, seeing his reflection in the water, tried to take the meat from the "other dog", and, in doing so, lost his own piece. For present purposes the moral cannot be better: "beware lest you lose the substance by grasping at the shadow".
